Federal Court Reverses Standard Insurance Company's Denial Of Long-Term Disability Benefits To An Attorney

The case we are going to discuss here highlights one of the ways an insurance company attempts to justify discontinuance of benefits after they have begun paying them.

George Nevitt, a practicing attorney fell down a flight of stairs on June 19, 2001. His injuries were so severe, that The Standard Insurance Company (Standard), the company that provided his company’s employee welfare benefit plan, initially approved Nevitt’s claim for disability benefits. In April 2007, Standard terminated Nevitt's coverage claiming that he no longer qualified because of the mental disorder limitation of the plan.

 

After Nevitt exhausted all of his administrative remedies he filed suit before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, requesting summary judgment. Standard responded by moving for summary judgment on their behalf. Nevitt responded by filing a cross motion for summary judgment, to which Standard responded by filing an additional motion for summary judgment. Nevitt then moved to strike Standard's additional motion.

 

Let’s look at the background presented by the administrative record. After his fall, in June of 2001, Nevitt began to experience frequent migraine headaches, pain in his neck and both arms. His cognitive abilities were also impaired. In August, he saw his primary care physician, a neurologist and a physical therapist. He was forced to cut back the number of hours he worked and finally underwent an MRI in September. The MRI revealed that he had herniations on both the C-4—C-5 and C-6—C-7 discs as well as a deformation of his spinal cord. Additional damage was also apparent in the MRI.

 

On November 15, 2001, Nevitt filed a claim for partial disability benefits. He had not been with the legal firm for a full year yet, so Standard ensured that Nevitt did not have a pre-existing condition. Standard had an internal medicine consultant review his medical records. This doctor noted that no pre-existing condition was found and that Nevitt's condition should gradually improve over time.

 

When Nevitt's condition did not improve, his neurologist recommended that he consult a neurosurgeon. He did this in May of 2002. The neurosurgeon suggested that he needed surgery to repair the herniations and spondylitic spurring shown on the MRI. Nevitt was reluctant to undergo the surgery, so the neurosurgeon referred him to a board certified pain management and rehabilitation specialist.

 

In December of 2003, Nevitt stopped working entirely. An independent medical examiner checked him for his workman's comp claim. The doctor that conducted the exam reported that he could return back to work if the duties of his job were modified. Nevitt went back to his neurosurgeon who again recommended surgery, and also referred Nevitt to a neuropsychologist who diagnosed him with post-concussive injuries, concluding that Nevitt's cognitive impairment affected his ability to practice law. He noted that Nevitt was emotionally distressed which was affecting his cognitive abilities, and as a result, he recommended pharmacological treatment for depression.

 

Nine months later in August 2004, Standard ordered an independent medical examination. This doctor concluded that Nevitt had no neuropsychological issues that would limit his ability to work. However, his attending physician disagreed and continued to restrict him from working.

 

Another year passed. In August 2005, Standard asked a neurologist to review Nevitt’s records. This neurologist concluded that Nevitt was not disabled from practicing law and recommended follow-up treatment for Nevitt’s migraines. At the same time, Standard asked a psychiatrist to review Nevitt’s records. The psychiatrist concluded that he had suffered from major depression at times but he could return to work with continuing emotional support. His treating physician disagreed with this diagnosis, and continued to restrict him from returning to work.

 

In October 2006, Standard ordered an independent medical exam. This neurologist, after seeing Nevitt, concluded that Nevitt’s complaints were out of proportion to his injury and there was no reason why he could not perform a sedentary desk job without any restrictions.

 

Standard terminated Nevitt's long-term disability benefits in April 2007. They stated that his benefits were limited to 24 months because anxiety and depression contributed to his disability. He appealed on October 12, 2007, citing his cervical pain, migraine headaches, and brain injury, which were independently disabling and were not subject to the mental disorder limitation. He provided affidavits from his attending physicians, a detailed account of his fall, a functional capacity evaluation and job simulation test as evidence of his disability not being related to a mental condition. The same claims specialist who had determined that he no longer qualified for long-term disability reviewed the additional material and upheld the termination.

 

The file was sent to Standard’s Administrative Review Unit for an independent review.  Nevitt submitted additional documentation. One report from a neurologist stated that his migraines could be expected to cause him to miss 5 to 7 days of work every month. A second report from a vocational consultant stated that Nevitt was no longer able to practice law because of his limitations. Standard also submitted a neurologist’s report that disagreed, claiming that the migraine should only impair Nevitt for one or two days per occurrence, concluding he could not see how this would disable him from practicing law.

 

The Administrative Review Unit upheld Standard’s termination of benefits. They gave Nevitt copies of the medical records that were used to make its determination. In response, Nevitt underwent additional tests to address the concerns that Standard’s consulting physicians had expressed. The results of these tests were sent to the claims specialist for consideration. The specialist stated that the tests relayed no new information and the original decision to terminate was upheld.

 

In order to sort this matter out, the Court looked at several things. First, the Court had to evaluate the reasonableness of Standard’s determination in the light of the material recorded in the administrative record. To do this the Court had to determine whether the Court agreed with the claim administrator’s benefits denial decision.

 

The Court looked at the policy language, asking what had Standard promised in the policy? First, the policy stated that it covered disability which resulted from physical disease, injury, pregnancy, or mental disorder if the policyholder was unable to work within their "own occupation." The policy stated that long-term benefits were limited to 24 months for "each period of continuous disability caused or contributed to by a mental disorder." Included in mental disorders were things such as "depression or depressive disorders" and "anxiety and anxiety disorders."

 

Nevitt argued that his condition did not fall under the clause for mental disorder because he was totally disabled apart from any mental problems that he might have. The Court agreed. When the Court reviewed the administrative record used at the time of the decision to terminate Nevitt’s long-term disability policy, the Court reached a different decision. They determined that the administrative record demonstrated at least three conditions, other than a mental disorder, that contributed to Nevitt's disability. The medical records substantiated the continued probability of Nevitt’s missing work for at least 5 to 7 days per month, which is unacceptable in the practice of law.

 

Nevitt’s motion for summary judgment was granted on December 3, 2009. Standard was ordered to reinstate his long-term disability benefits.

 

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.

 

Tribal Court Retains Jurisdiction For Tribal Member's Disability Insurance Lawsuit Against Assurant And Union Security

When Richard Geroux brought a long-term disability insurance underpayment complaint before the Tribal Court of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, L’Anse Reservation, Mich., the insurance companies involved, Assurant, Inc (Assurant) and Union Security Insurance Company (Union Security) immediately sought to remove his case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Northern Division. The insurance companies claimed that Geroux’s case fell under ERISA jurisdiction and should be considered in Federal Court.

What is at stake here? Whether the tribal court had jurisdiction. Geroux moved on August 8, 2008 to have his case sent back to tribal court, arguing that his complaint should be decided in tribal court. The Assurant and Union Security filed a counterclaim on August 21, 2008 seeking to move action to Federal Court. They also opposed Geroux’s motion to review the case at tribal council on August 25. In response, Geroux moved to dismiss Union Security’s counterclaim.

On October 15, in this environment of motions and counterclaims, the court denied Assurant and Union Security’s motion that Geroux’s reply brief (arguments for sending the case back to tribal court) be annulled. The court ruled instead to allow Assurant and Union Security to file a reply brief presenting their arguments for deciding the case in Federal Court.

The Court ordered both parties to present further evidentiary support for their positions. Geroux asked for an extension of time to accomplish this. The court gave him until December 5, 2008. Then Assurant and Union Security asked for an extension to December 12. This was also granted. On December 12th and 13th both sides filed their supplemental briefings and evidence supporting their motions. Ten days later, Assurant and Union Security filed a motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery and to file their response to Geroux’s supplemental briefing of the 12th. The court ordered that the response must be filed by January 14, 2009 and set the date for a hearing before the U.S. Magistrate Judge—January 21, 2009.

At that hearing, the judge found that some jurisdictional discovery was necessary and asked Assurant and Union Security to submit a discovery plan to the court. On January 26, 2009, the insurance companies submitted a proposal requiring 180 days to accomplish the necessary research. This was approved on January 27.

During a June 17 tele-conference, the court validated the 180 day deadline. On August 26, Assurant and Union Security requested an extension of 90 days for jurisdictional discovery, and then another 30 days beyond that in which to file their response to Geroux’s supplemental brief. On August 28, the court ordered Geroux to respond to the request for extension by September 11. When a response was not received by this date, the court issued a written notice. On October 6, Geroux filed a notice of non-opposition. On October 13, the court denied the motion for an extension. After 30 days, when neither side had filed additional briefings or evidence, the court proceeded with its decision.

Here are the laws that the court took into consideration:

In general, if a civil action is brought before a state court, the defendant(s) can move the case to Federal court if the US District Court had original jurisdiction. This is automatic if the claim or right arises under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. Otherwise, civil cases can only be moved if none of the parties in the case are residents of the state in which the case is filed.

If the defendant wants to move a case to Federal court, the burden of proof that the case should be decided within Federal jurisdiction falls upon the defendant. Assurant and Union Security tried to prove Federal jurisdiction by claiming that Geroux’s claim was based on his being a beneficiary of an “employee benefit plan” under ERISA. But ERISA provides beneficiaries the right to file civil actions to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan, to seek enforcement of rights under a plan, or to clarify future benefits under the terms of a plan.

In 2006, Congress amended ERISA to exclude tribal benefits plans from ERISA’s surveillance. While this law was not retroactive, the court still needed to determine if removal from tribal court to Federal court violated Federal law. Geroux claimed that remedies at the tribal level needed to be exhausted before the case could be sent to Federal court.

What finally determined the outcome? Assurant and Union Security were unable, after nearly a year, to support their claim that Federal court held jurisdiction over the case. Case law favored Geroux’s position and without convincing proof of jurisdiction, the Federal court preferred to let the tribal court make the first effort in sorting out the facts. The court felt no pity for the insurance company’s complaints that sending the case back to the tribe would delay the litigation process. In response, the court pointed out how the insurance companies had already delayed the process by almost a year.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.
 

Appellat Court Reverses Unum's Denial Of Disability Benefits To A Registered Nurse ("RN") And Trial Court Victory

Many long-term disability cases revolve around the issue of what constitutes the ability or inability to work in any gainful employment for which you “are reasonably fitted by education, training or experience.” The following case is another example.

In July of 2001, Linda Gardner stopped working as an operating room nurse. She had been diagnosed with avascular necrosis (AVN) in both of her knees, explaining the severe pain she had been suffering from. One of the symptoms of AV is its progressive nature. Temporary or permanent loss of blood supply to affected bones destroys the bone tissue and causes collapse. The resulting pain in an affected joint can limit movement severely.

Within a month of leaving work, Gardner underwent a bilateral knee replacement and begin collecting short-term disability insurance payments through her policy with Unum Life Insurance Company of America (Unum). Unfortunately, this surgery was unsuccessful, so in February of 2002 she had both knees replaced.

Unum approved Gardner’s claim for long-term disability benefits on February 18, 2002. The policy stipulated that after 24 months, Gardner would only be considered disabled if Unum determined that due to the same condition that had entitled her to long-term disability she was unable to perform the duties of any gainful occupation for which she was reasonably fitted by education, training or experience.

The court would find the medical history recorded during those 24 months relevant to their decision, so we will look at that history.

After her second surgery, Gardner found pain management difficult. In June 2002, when the pain spread to her ankles, the orthopedic surgeon who had performed the knee replacements recommended another MRI and x-ray. He found evidence that the AVN was causing damage to the bones in her ankles.

In November of 2002, Gardner begin working part time at a facility near her home that was willing to accommodate her limitations. The position was per diem based, which meant that she occasionally provided lunch relief as an RN. As she reported in a letter to Unum in April 2003, she might not work for three or four weeks in a row, was never able to work two days in a row, and after the times when she did work, she spent the next several days with her legs propped up, recovering from the pain. She stated that she worked anyway because it helped with her state of mind. She was able to take care of herself, but spent most of the day sitting or lying on the sofa watching TV. She went out occasionally to do her shopping but had to spend a while after that with her legs propped up.

Her orthopedic surgeon filled out Unum’s attending physician statement. He stated that her symptoms were unchanged, except that now she had AVN of the ankles. He explained that he had released her to work in her own field, but that she was unable to work for more than 10 hours a week. He also indicated that her current functional abilities were limited to 3 to 4 hours of sedentary activity every other day. He noted that he did not expect these abilities to change. Gardner attached this attending physician statement to her letter.

Unum requested clarification from Gardner’s orthopedic surgeon. What would be her status for full-time? In a letter dated July 16, 2003, her doctor stated that he did “not anticipate any significant change in her critical status, and, therefore, do not anticipate a significant change in her ability to be gainfully employed.” He went on to say that the condition in her ankles could worsen with time, and the status of her knees might also worsen.

In November 2003, Gardner told Unum that her status had not changed. It had been sometime since she had seen her orthopedic surgeon because she felt there was nothing more that he could do to help her. In response, Unum had an RN review Gardner’s file to evaluate her “expected long-term prognosis.” This nurse concluded that it was unclear as to what would prevent Gardner’s improvement over time, especially if her current level of functioning was tolerable.

Based on this finding, Unum requested that a vocational consultant review Gardner’s file and identify fulltime sedentary positions that Gardner would be qualified to fill. First, a transferable skills analysis suggested occupations outside of nursing. A second review identified several nursing occupations that could provide gainful wages.

Unum called Gardner on January 29, 2004. During the call, she described the level of her pain as consistent and aggravated by activity. She reported that almost everything that she did caused pain that only responded to narcotics, which doctors were unwilling to prescribe for her.

On February 12, 2004, a nurse consultant hired by Unum reported that based on Gardner’s medical history and surgical history, that working 10 hours a week expressed a maximum capability for work. The consultant suggested that Gardner was actually pushing herself to even accomplish this.

Unum then asked a physiatrist consultant to respond to the nurse consultant’s analysis and conclusion. The physiatrist noted that Gardner’s orthopedic surgeon had not responded to a previous inquiry as to why Gardner didn’t have greater sedentary capacity. On February 17, Unum notified Gardner in writing that they were going to contact her orthopedic surgeon so they could better understand her current level of functionality.

They faxed a letter to her doctor the next day. After explaining that as a physiatrist consultant, he couldn’t see any reason why Gardner couldn’t work in a sedentary job, he asked her doctor to either agree that she could perform sedentary work for 8 hours a day or disagree by providing a list of objective reasons.

After examining Gardner on March 1st, her orthopedic surgeon signed below the paragraph in Unum’s letter stating that she could perform full time sedentary work if certain accommodations were made. She would have to be allowed to change her position frequently and need a special footrest.

Based on this information, on March 12, 2004, Unum notified Gardner that it would discontinue her benefits. They explained that its medical consultant had contacted her orthopedic surgeon, who had concluded that with certain restrictions she should be able to work full time in a sedentary position. They gave her a list of potential job positions that Unum believed she could perform.

Gardner appealed her denial of long term disability benefits. She pointed out that the letter sent to her orthopedic surgeon described the duties performed in her part time job inaccurately. She was not an operating room nurse. She only assisted in a colonoscopy facility. She submitted a vocational expert’s report that verified her inability to earn a gainful wage.

Before responding, Unum had another nurse consultant review her file. This consultant voiced concerns that her pain level could make even sedentary work intolerable. He didn’t feel that there was proof that she would be able to tolerate more than the amount of work she had already been doing. This report was forward to another doctor for review. This doctor disagreed with the nurse consultant, and concluded that it was reasonable for Gardner to work full-time following her orthopedic surgeon’s guidelines.

On September 27, 2004, Unum notified Gardner that her appeal had been denied and that the updated vocational assessment had identified the following occupations that would be appropriate for her within the medical field: bill reviewer, insurance case manager, managed health care manager, and telephonic triage nurse.

Gardner filed action through counsel in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, requesting review of Unum’s denial of her long-term disability benefits. Unum moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Unum and denied Gardner’s cross motion.

But the story wasn’t over. Gardner appealed the dismissal of her case to the the District Court of Appeals,. Her contention: that the denial of her benefits was based on inaccuracies in the records that Unum used to determine her case.

The Court of Appeals limited itself to discussing only material which had been submitted to the District Court. Here is what they found:

Unum relied heavily on the March 2004 evaluation of Gardner’s condition which Gardner asserts does not reflect her doctor’s medical opinion accurately because the information provided to him did not reflect her actual job duties or the work hours that she was committed to. The Court had to resolve the inconsistency by weighing the evidence.

The Court found that Gardner’s assertion that her doctor’s March 2004 evaluation was unreliable was supported by the facts. Prior to this time, his reports had been very detailed. This report was unlike any others that he presented.

Gardner’s qualifications for the jobs that Unum claimed she was qualified for were also disputable. The court found that the record shed little light on how they came to conclusion that Gardner had the requisite skills for the jobs they recommended.

The Court also took under consideration whether Unum had been arbitrary and capricious in their decision. The Court was able to consider this because Unum operated under a conflict of interest as the plan administrator and the payer of benefits. Because Unum has a history of deception and abusive tactics, the Court questioned whether conflict of interest had played a role in the decision.

The court also considered whether Unum had emphasized medical reports that favored denying benefits at the expense of reports that favored paying benefits. They found the ignoring of all reports from the orthopedic surgeon except the one that favored them was compelling evidence that Unum was biased in their decision making process. This was supported by the fact that they disregarded the reasonable arguments of two of their own consultants.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the summary judgment rendered by the District Court was inappropriate and set it aside. Gardner’s case has been sent back to District Court where several courses may be pursued. The case may be sent back to Unum for reconsideration, or further discovery or a trial on the merits of the case might also result.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.


 

Disability Claimant Takes Reliance Standard To Court Twice Within 5 Years

A ruling in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (“Reliance”) acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denied Elizabeth Diamond long-term disability benefits. Here is her story.

Ms. Diamond worked for Paine Webber as a desktop publisher. Coverage from Reliance through a Group Long Term Disability (LTD) Insurance Policy paid for by her employer was included in her benefits package. Ms. Diamond fell ill and ceased working on September 9, 2000. She first applied for long-term disability benefits in early March of 2001.

She received a letter dated March 26, 2001, instructing her to apply for Social Security disability insurance benefits if she thought that she would be ill for more than 12 months. She followed these instructions and on August 24, 2001, she received a letter from the Social Security administration finding that she was disabled and awarding her benefits accordingly. Two years later, her disability was re-evaluated. Social Security found that her disability was continuing.

Diamond’s attending physician, noted in her file on September 8, 2004, that his diagnosis for her condition was “Bechet’s disease”, with other symptoms being present such as fibromyalgia, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, migraine headaches, metabolic syndrome, depression and gastritis. He noted that diamond suffered from daily debilitating headaches and frequent breakouts the painful sores in both her GI tract and on the outer surface of the body. It should be noted that Bechet’s disease is a chronic disorder that causes inflammation of small blood vessels throughout body. So it’s understandable that her doctor’s notes indicate that there were many days when she was so tired she couldn’t even take a shower or get out of bed. About the same time, another doctor diagnosed Diamond with chronic migraines which did not respond to medication.

Almost a year later, her doctor indicated she only had 20% of her functional abilities. He noted that her symptoms were so severe they troubled her even when she was resting. At the same time, she went to a headache specialist that found that she had intractable migraines and a degree of neurological impairment but still has the ability to carry out “most of the activities of daily living.”

Set against this background, Reliance initially denied benefits to Diamond on June 14, 2002, claiming that she suffered from no physical impairment that would prevent her from performing the duties of her sedentary occupation. Reliance argued that Diamond could perform the material duties of her regular occupation, and thus was not entitled to long-term disability coverage. Diamond appealed and was denied once again.

After she had exhausted her administrative remedies, Diamond filed an action in Federal Court in 2003. Litigation was settled in July of 2004, with Reliance agreeing to pay Diamond disability benefits with interest and attorney’s fees.

But the story wasn’t over yet. After the settlement, Reliance once again denied Long-term disability benefits effective October 8, 2005. Reliance stated that Diamond was capable a performing the duties of her own occupation.

Diamond appealed, pointing to the various diseases her doctors had diagnosed and how the symptoms from these diseases were preventing her from returning to even a part time work schedule. Reliance’s response was to have her file reviewed by a doctor who did not examine her, but evaluated that there was no evidence in her file to suggest that her impairment would prevent her from performing sedentary work. The doctor went on to state that he saw nothing in the file to indicate what might be causing Diamond’s self reported chronic fatigue. Based on this doctor’s review, Reliance refused to reverse their decision to terminate Diamond’s disability payments.

Diamond then filed her second lawsuit against Reliance, claiming that the denial of her appeal and termination of her LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious. She asked that her LTD benefits be reinstated retroactively and that she be compensated for her attorney fees, costs and prejudgment interest.

When the Court reviewed Diamond’s case, they considered whether Reliance’s decision was “based on a consideration of relevant factors.” And their decision had to be limited to the reasons given by Reliance at the time of the denial. During this process, they observed procedural irregularities that suggested a failure to consider the relevant factors.

In this case, they found that Reliance’s claim to have “lost” Diamond’s file demonstrated procedural irregularities that were unacceptable. The Court also found that Reliance emphasized the findings of a physician who had never seen Diamond over the findings of several physicians who had.

They also found the Reliance had failed to conduct an independent medical evaluation before reversing their position, and reverting to their denial of her first disability claim. In fact, there was no evidence that Reliance had even reviewed the updated information that Diamond had supplied, even though three years had passed since she had filed originally.

The Court also found that Reliance failed to give weight to the fact that Social Security had found Diamond was disabled, not only initially, but after a second review, two years later.

In the light of these facts, the Court issued summary judgment in Diamond’s favor, ordering Reliance to reinstate Diamond’s long-term disability benefits.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.

 

Unum's Attempts To Dismiss A Physician's Bad Faith Disability Lawsuit Are Denied By Pennsylvania Federal Court

An opinion issued by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in November 2009 highlights the challenges an attorney faces when a complaint for denial of disability insurance benefits involves parties from different jurisdictions. An attorney must be very knowledgeable regarding insurance contract law in their state, because the laws of the state in which the contract is signed are the laws that will apply unless preempted by ERISA.

The case we are going to consider involves Edward J. Zaloga, a doctor of osteopathy. He filed his complaint originally in the Court of Common Pleas for Lackawanna County, Penn. in December 24, 2008. Because the claim exceeded the value of $75,000 and neither Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company (Provident Life) nor Unum Group (Unum) had corporate offices in Pennsylvania, jurisdiction over the case resided with the U.S. District Court.

The issue here was the nature of the claim Zaloga would be allowed to bring before the court. His claim alleged that Provident Life and Unum had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in reversing their decision to provide him with long-term disability coverage. Several accusations with supporting statements were included in the claim. The insurance companies moved to have many of these pleadings/arguments struck from the claim.

Before we look at how the Court evaluated these motions, let us review the background behind the complaint.

Zaloga was an osteopathic physician and surgeon certified in internal medicine and nephrology. He applied to Provident Life for a private disability insurance policy. The following summarizes the benefits the policy promised.

 Predetermined premiums were guaranteed until the later of Zaloga’s 65th birthday or five years.
 It was not cancellable.
 The policy provided for graduated monthly disability insurance benefits that started at $5000 a month with annual increases until the monthly disability amount reached $6400 by July 13, 2004.
 The benefits would be payable after 90 days of the onset of the disability.
 If the disability was caused by an injury and before Zaloga's 65th birthday, the benefits would continue for life.

On June 17, 2002, Dr. Zaloga was injured in a motor vehicle accident. His injuries included orthopedic and neurological damage to his neck, left arm and left-hand. By July 13, the complications from his injuries had worsened to the point that his attending physicians determined he would be unable to work as a board certified nephrologist. This determination was a major concern because he had been involved in an affiliation with a medical practice where he served in a relief capacity.

On November 29, and December 15, 2005, Dr. Zaloga notified Provident Life and Unum that he was filing a claim for disability benefits. The insurance companies investigated his claim. Upon completing their investigation which included researching Zaloga 's own occupation and ventures, his claim was approved. They determined that:

1) Zaloga had been disabled on July 13, 2004.
2) His "own occupation" was a nephrologist.
3) Zaloga was unable to perform the duties of a nephrologist.
4) His premiums would be waived as stipulated in the policy, retroactive to July 13, 2004.

From the time his disability was approved, on August 15, 2006 through February 15, 2008, Zaloga provided monthly supplemental claim forms as requested by the insurance companies. During this time, Provident Life and Unum assigned his file to a new disability benefits specialist. The new specialist reviewed Zaloga's claim file and drew the conclusion that Zaloga had not been working as a nephrologist on the date of his disability, but rather had been acting as chief medical officer of the medical services provider from June 1, 2004 onward.

The benefits specialist also called into question Zaloga's earnings prior to his disability. Provident Life and Unum concluded based on this reevaluation that he had a "dual occupation" prior to the date of his disability. Without consulting any external sources, they terminated his disability benefits.

When the case came before the Court numerous motions from Provident Life and Unum to strike out portions of Zaloga’s claim had to be considered.

The insurance companies claimed that Zaloga's complaint for breach of the covenant of fair dealing should be dismissed because Zaloga had not stated a claim upon which relief of a breach of fair dealing could be granted in the state of Pennsylvania. In reviewing cases handled by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Court found that while Pennsylvania law did not support a separate independent action when a breach of contract occurred, this did not negate Zaloga’s rights to recover compensatory damages. The Court upheld inclusion of the motion.

As part of his claim, Zaloga argued that Provident Life and Unum violated the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) because the insurers did not obtain additional information, but instead they reevaluated the information already existing in their files. In the process of reevaluating this information they applied a new definition of total disability that differed from that used originally in the policy language. He claimed that this violated Provident Life and Unum's own investigative procedures, this demonstrated malfeasance in Zaloga’s opinion.

While the Court finding agreed that there was a question of the propriety of the insurance company granting the disability claim and later reversing itself, the malfeasance of the matter wasn't black-and-white. The court found it plausible to conclude that the insurance companies had misperformed rather than failed to perform their duty. The Court upheld this aspect of Zaloga's complaint as worthy of review.

Provident Life and Unum didn't like some of the allegations made in Zaloga's claim. They sought to have the offending paragraphs struck from the claim, arguing that the allegations bore no connection to a bad faith or breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law. The Court disagreed. They found that the allegations might ultimately prove irrelevant to the disposition of the case, but the court agreed with Zaloga's argument that the allegations were included to "show a common design and scheme on the part of the defendants."

Because a bad faith claim can only succeed in the state of Pennsylvania if the plaintiff insured proves that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, the court found that presenting evidence that demonstrates the failure of the insurer to behave in a reasonable manner would be allowed.

The Court concluded that Zaloga had the right to bring his breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim before the court as originally filed. The court also found that the insurance companies had failed to show that Zaloga's UTPCPL claim was implausible. Provident Life and Unum were directed to file an answer to Zaloga's complaint within 20 days.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.
 

Court Finds MetLife's Denial Of Short-Term Disability Benefits Arbitrary And Capricious

After 18 years of work as a management assistant at Raytheon Company, Dorothy Whitehouse suffered a psychotic episode in the workplace triggered by an experience with her boss and co-workers. The severity of the attack prompted her to immediately schedule an emergency appointment with her therapist, a licensed social worker on August 23, 2007.

On August 28, Whitehouse filed a claim for short-term disability benefits with MetLife, the insurance company that provided Raytheon’s short-term disability basic benefit plan. The company plan provided income replacement at 75% of her weekly base pay for 10 weeks. She also participated in a short-term disability plus coverage plan that covered the remaining 25% of her weekly base pay.

Whitehouse went to see a psychiatrist who submitted session notes to MetLife on August 30. Whitehouse's therapist also sent a short letter to MetLife on September 6. He described the incident precipitating her claim and stated that she reported a feeling of exhaustion, inability to focus and fear. He noted that she was seeing him and that he had also encouraged a transfer from her work environment.

On September 7, during a phone call with a MetLife representative, her therapist stated that Whitehouse had suffered a mental breakdown and had visited him twice since the incident. He felt she was doing better. The same MetLife representative spoke with Whitehouse as well. She told him that September 6 was the first time she'd been able to leave her house since her appointment with her therapist. See said her therapist had recommended that she take a leave of absence from work, claiming that both her psychiatrist and therapist had told her not to think about work.

On September 25, Whitehouse's husband called MetLife to inform them that she was seeing a different psychiatrist who had doubled her antipsychotic medication. The MetLife representative consulted an independent board certified psychiatrist the same day who gave his opinion, that Whitehouse was just staying home in order to avoid dealing with her supervisor and because she was afraid of another paranoia attack. Based on this conclusion, the MetLife recommended that Whitehouse’s claim be denied.

The next day on September 26, Whitehouse’s therapist called to give an update on her condition. He said that she had not shown any further paranoia symptoms since the work incident, but she did continue to exhibit anxiety and depression.

On September 27, MetLife notified Whitehouse of its decision to deny her short-term disability claim. They stated that her clinical data did not support the existence of a condition that would render her totally disabled and unable to perform her job. They found that she was ineligible for any benefits because the plan’s waiting period extended to August 30, and she'd only been disabled from August 23 through August 30.

Whitehouse appealed the denial. She asked her psychiatrist and therapist to submit additional information on her behalf. Anderson did so on October 1. He diagnosed her with "a major depressive disorder with psychotic features." He compared the onset of the psychotic episode to a posttraumatic stress disorder incident which could be triggered or reactivated by the behavior of a colleague in the workplace. He stated, "Ms. Whitehouse is still clearly not mentally or emotionally capable of returning to work at this time...". It should be noted that psychotic features include delusions and seeing or hearing things that aren't there.

MetLife sent Whitehouse’s appeal to another board certified psychiatrist. His assessment, released on October 17, concluded that there was insufficient documentation to prove that Whitehouse had any formal thought disorder that would prevent her from being able to work or function. He claimed that if Whitehouse was able to drive and perform the activities of daily living and manage her finances, there was no reason she should not be able to return to work.

MetLife sent a copy of this report to Whitehouse's therapist on October 18, giving him 10 days to respond. They also sent a copy of the report to her previous psychiatrist, even though they had been informed that she had changed psychiatrists. Instead of waiting 10 days to receive a reply from either source, MetLife denied Whitehouse’s appeal four days later on October 22.

They received a response from her therapist on October 24, just two days after they sent out the denial letter and within the 10-day time limitation. In his letter, he noted significant errors in MetLife's assessment. He restated his conclusion that she was still significantly impaired and unable to return to work. He contested her ability to function saying that she barely managed, could drive occasionally, but he stated that she was unable to manage her finances without assistance. He expressed his surprise that both his records and the report of her treating psychiatrist were not being used to support her claim of serious functional limitation.

MetLife had their psychiatrist review her therapist’s letter and speak with her treating psychiatrist. MetLife’s psychiatrist noted that her psychiatrist strongly supported her debility, but in his November 7 assessment concluded that her inability to function was still not supported adequately, claiming that his telephone conversations with both her psychiatrist and her therapist contradicted their assertions regarding her capabilities.

MetLife affirmed their denial by letter on November 9. Whitehouse responded by seeking judicial review under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). She sought to recover the benefits due to her under the terms of both the short-term and long-term disability benefit plans operated by MetLife, which she calculated to be worth $52,152.31 including health insurance payments, denied benefits and legal fees. Both Whitehouse and MetLife filed cross motions on the administrative record, the file used to determine the claim decision.

First, the Court had to determine the standard under which they were to review the case. Because they found that the plan gave discretionary authority to the plan administrator, the Court had to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. This meant that if MetLife's process was reasoned and supported by substantial evidence, the court would uphold its denial of benefits.

When the court looked at the administrative record, they found that MetLife's denial of Whitehouse’s appeal was arbitrary and capricious. They found that issuing the denial without waiting for response, within the 10-day time limitation, demonstrated arbitrary and capricious action. They also found that the findings of Whitehouse’s doctors were consistently mischaracterized and inconsistent with the evidence.

The court recognized that plan administrators don't have to give special weight to treating therapist’s opinions, but to ignore the opinion entirely as MetLife did was arbitrary. The court found that MetLife was inconsistent in its review of the psychiatric notes from Whitehouse’s attending physicians. They claimed that pharmacotherapy did not appear to be particularly aggressive, ignoring the psychiatric notes listing the doubling of her antipsychotic medication. In fact, the Court found that MetLife had never sent her new psychiatrist the report that her therapist had corrected.

The court also found that the November 9 denial failed to meaningfully consider the evidence that Whitehouse supplied in response to her denial. They brushed aside her therapist’s opinion that conflicted with their psychiatrist’s assessment. They also misquoted her psychiatrist as saying she was able to function, when he had clearly stated that she was not able to function.

The Court also found that MetLife did not update its factual conclusions when they received new information that contradicted prior assumptions. They made statements into “fact” without supporting evidence. In fact, evidence to support opposite facts had been provided. The denials continued to include factual inaccuracies that had been refuted by Whitehouse’s treating physicians. The court found their denial of short-term disability benefits was capricious and arbitrary.

Whitehouse was also seeking long-term disability benefits, but the court found that because she had not been qualified by MetLife to receive the full 10-weeks of short-term disability benefits, the insurer had never reviewed her claim for long-term disability benefits. So the court awarded Whitehouse short-term disability benefits for the time between August 31, 2007 and October 24, 2007. The court then sent the extension of short-term disability benefits and long-term disability benefits decision back to MetLife for review. The court also awarded costs to Whitehouse.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-SAY-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.

 

Attorneys Dell & Schaefer Files Lawsuit And Obtains Lump-Sum Buyout Of Disability Policy For Podiatrist With Median Nerve Injury

Dr. C, a podiatrist / podiatric surgeon, was successfully practicing in Texas prior to the injury which caused his disability. During a routine blood draw, the phlebotomist taking Dr. C’s blood sample mistakenly injected the needle too deep into Dr. C’s right arm. Dr. C immediately felt shooting and burning pain radiating down his right arm and into his hand. In the weeks that followed, Dr. C experienced severe burning and tingling in his right arm. Dr. C consulted with a colleague in the hospital, a hand specialist, who explained that it was likely that the phlebotomist had injured his median nerve during the blood draw. The hand specialist advised Dr. C that if his symptoms did not resolve within a few weeks to come back and see him.

The pain, numbness, tingling and paresthesia which Dr. C was experiencing in his right hand did not resolve and although he had continued working as best he could, his symptoms began affecting his ability to perform his core procedures as a podiatrist / podiatric surgeon. In the hopes that his symptoms would resolve with time, Dr. C decided to take a leave of absence and initiate a claim with his long-term disability insurance carrier.

After submitting his long-term disability claim, Dr. C’s disability insurance company began their investigation. The disability carrier took him through the usual steps of requesting Dr. C’s medical records, tax returns, personal and business financial records, CPT codes and a volume of other relevant and non-relevant items. The disability insurance company even sent Dr. C to an independent medical examination (“IME”) with a neurologist, which the insurance company selected to examine Dr. C’s hand. The insurance company’s hired doctor determined that, given the requirements of Dr. C’s occupation as a podiatrist, Dr. C would be limited from performing his occupational duties, including his ability to perform fine motor tasks such as handling surgical instruments that would require prolonged use of his right hand. Shortly following the IME, the disability carrier began paying Dr. C’s disability benefits.

The disability carrier paid Dr. C’s disability benefits for almost two years before they decided to send Dr. C to a second IME with an orthopedic hand surgeon. After a brief examination the second IME opined that although Dr. C likely sustained an injury to his median nerve his complaints were only subjective and therefore they should not restrict him from performing his duties as a podiatrist. After receiving the opinion from the second IME the disability insurance carrier terminated Dr. C’s claim for disability benefits.

After receiving his denial letter, Dr. C retained Attorneys Dell & Schaefer to represent him. Dr. C’s attorneys, Gregory Dell and Cesar Gavidia promptly filed suit for breach of contract against the disability insurance company in state court. Shortly after participating in extensive discovery and subpoenaing volumes of documentation from the disability insurance company, which included every document which the disability insurance company produced in connection with Dr. C’s claim for benefits, including the insurance company’s underwriting and application file, the insurance company settled with Dr. C. for a lump-sum buyout of his disability insurance policy.
 

Attorneys Dell & Schaefer File Lawsuit And Obtain Lump-Sum Buyout For Chiropractor After Disability Carrier Denies Disability Benefits

Dr. Z, a chiropractor, suffered an injury to both of his wrists while performing work in his backyard. As a result, Dr. Z was forced to discontinue his profession as a chiropractor and file disability claims under his three long-term disability insurance policies. Wanting to insure his financial future in the event that he became disabled, Dr. Z maintained three individual disability policies with three different insurance companies. Initially, the disability carriers approved Dr. Z’s claims and began paying him monthly disability benefits.

Over the years, Dr. Z’s hands and wrists continued to degenerate, developing arthritis and becoming deformed. He also developed osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, herniated discs and multiple lumbar and compression fractures of the spine. There was no question that Dr. Z was totally disabled from the practice of chiropractic and that his health was only getting worse. This was evidenced further by the fact that all of his disability carriers paid and accepted liability for his claims.

Shortly after stopping the treatment of patients, Dr. Z began working part time providing consulting services approximately 4-6 hours per week and began working part time doing billing and public relations earning $7.00 per hour. At no time did he return to the practice of chiropractic.

Despite being provided with volumes of medical documentation supporting Dr. Z’s total disability, one of Dr. Z’s disability insurance carriers decided to terminate Dr. Z’s claim for benefits after paying him for several years. The insurance company also alleged that Dr. Z committed fraud by allegedly working during the period of time which he claimed he was totally disabled and unable to treat patients. The disability carrier further claimed an overpayment of disability benefits. Dr. Z maintained that he never treated patients after he became totally disabled and that the insurance company was merely taking advantage of the fact that bad times had befallen Dr. Z.

Dr. Z retained Dell & Schaefer to represent him against his disability insurance company. Dr. Z’s attorneys, Gregory Dell and Cesar Gavidia began by sending a letter to the insurance company demanding that they recommence the payment of total disability benefits and threatening suit if benefits within a specific time frame. After several communications, the parties agreed to sit down and informally attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation prior to the commencement of a lawsuit. Although neither side conceded any arguments, the parties agreed that it was best to settle the matter as opposed to initiating a lengthy and contentious lawsuit. To this day, Dr. Z’s remaining two disability carriers have continued to pay disability benefits without interruption.
 

Court Finds CIGNA Failed To Follow Proper Claim Denial Procedure, Nurse's Right To Pursue Disability Law Suit Under ERISA Supported

Linda Chavis filed a complaint against Cigna Group Insurance and Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA) on June 24, 2009, alleging that the insurance company had breached two disability insurance contracts by refusing to pay her claims for short-term disability (STD) insurance and for long-term disability (LTD) insurance. While Cigna filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, Chavis stated in her complaint that she and her employer had paid all the required premiums for both policies, but she had been wrongfully denied benefits for both policies.

In her complaint, Chavis, a registered nurse, claimed that she became disabled in June 2008 because of back problems that prevented her from fulfilling her role as a nurse. According to the disability definitions of both her short-term and long-term disability policies, she fit the description of a disabled individual. She was a) unable to perform all the material duties of her regular occupation, and b) she was unable to earn 80% or more of her covered earnings from working in her regular occupation.

Here’s how this case began. On June 9, 2008, Chavis applied for short term disability benefits over the phone. One month later, on July 18, LINA denied Chavis’ initial claim because they felt that there wasn’t enough medical information to support her claim. Chavis appealed. Her appeal was denied on November 10. Chavis appealed LINA’s decision once again on February 9, 2009.

On February 22, Chavis applied for long-term disability benefits. Based on the fact that they had already denied STD benefits, LINA denied this application as well on March 5. Chavis appealed.

Meanwhile, Chavis appeal for the short-term disability benefits was still under review. On March 13, this appeal was denied. Chavis appealed again for a third time. LINA initially rejected the appeal.

Having reached the conclusion that LINA was not going to approve her claim, Chavis filed the June 24 complaint in the Charleston Division of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. On July 13, 2009, LINA reversed its decision to deny STD benefits, and paid Chavis for 26 weeks of short-term disability. At the same time, LINA also reopened its review of Chavis’ application for LTD benefits. Three days later, on July 16, LINA claimed it received notice of Chavis’ complaint that had been filed in state court on June 24.

LINA says that it reevaluated Chavis’ LTD benefits claim, which resulted in a denial on August 20, 2009. Chavis did not appeal this decision. LINA asked the court for a motion to dismiss Chavis’ complaint because she had not submitted a written appeal of the August 20 denial, thus failing to exhaust her administrative remedies. Chavis countered with the argument that it would have been futile to do so. LINA also argued that Chavis’ failure to appeal the August 20 denial meant the Court should dismiss Chavis’ claims because she had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A motion to stay (suspend) proceedings was requested as an alternative while all the avenues of administrative remedy were exhausted.

In the end, the Court looked at one thing—the letter Chavis received on March 5, 2009, denying her long term disability benefits, the decision she did appeal. LINA argued in court that this was not an official denial of benefits letter. The court ruled otherwise. The letter used the word “determined”, but it failed to meet the requirements of ERISA which clearly states that a benefits denial letter must include the following information:

1) It must give specific reason for why benefits were denied.
2) It must identify the specific plan provisions used to make the determination.
3) It must describe any material or information that is needed to change the determination.
4) It must also describe the procedures used to review the claim and a clear breakdown of procedures the claimant needs to follow to appeal a decision and time limits for following those procedures.

When the March 5 letter was compared to this ERISA requirement it failed the test of substantial compliance with the spirit of the regulation. The judges concurred with Chavis’ contention that that initial LTD benefits denial violated the procedure set forth in 29 C.F.R § 2560.503-1(g). The letter only told her that she was not eligible, but stated no reason as to why she wasn’t eligible. It told her that her claim was closed, but did not tell her what she should do to appeal the closure of her case. All she was told to do was call if she had any questions.

Based on a ruling from Ellis v. MetLife Ins. Co., the Court deemed that Chavis had “exhausted the administrative remedies available under the plan.” Like MetLife, LINA had failed to follow “reasonable claims procedures.” LINA argued that this letter was not written to notify Chavis of an adverse benefit determination. It was only to inform her of her ineligibility for LTD benefits in light of the denial for STD benefits. Certainly, Ms. Chavis would not have seen this distinction. Neither did the Court.

The Court denied LINA’s motions for dismissal or a stay of Chavis’ complaint. Ms. Chavis’ right to pursue her lawsuit for breach of contract under ERISA was approved on December 8, 2009.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-Say-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.

 

 

Prudential's Failure To Produce Documents Weighs In Long Term Disability Claimant's Favor

In a ruling filed on November 17, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential) had failed to provide Barbara Brown adequate information with which to appeal their decision to deny her long term disability (LTD) benefits. As a result, the court did not apply a common court-approved practice which demands that all administrative options must be exhausted before filing suit.

Brown’s story began in August of 2005, when she stopped working for J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. (Hunt) because the pain she was experiencing in her neck, back, and left knee made it too difficult to drive a truck anymore. Prudential awarded Brown disability benefits in September based on her left knee condition which was deemed to be disabling and rendered Brown “unable to perform the material and substantial cuties of [her] regular occupation due to [her] injury.”

Brown had been a lifelong trucker until her knee pain made it impossible for her to manage the clutch. It was all she knew how to do. But in June of 2006, she received a letter informing her that Prudential had “obtain(ed) and review(ed) information” about her “medical condition,” “daily activities,” and “education, experience, and other occupations [she} would be qualified to perform.” Based on this information, Prudential was terminating her long term disability benefits, because she was now able to perform “the duties of any gainful occupation for which” she was “reasonably fitted by education, training or experience.” Prudential went on to list occupations that one of its vocational rehabilitation specialists had recommended for Brown—a semiconductor bonder, a surveillance system monitor, a food checker, or an assembler.

Prudential notified Brown that she had the right to appeal the decision within 180 days. The letter required the appeal to state the reasons Brown disagreed with their decision and to supply supporting evidence such as therapy treatment notes, physician’s records, test results and any other information that related to her claim.

Brown responded to the letter, by calling Prudential. In her conversation with a Prudential representative, she made it clear that she wanted to appeal. The representative told Brown that she needed to put her reasons for disagreeing with the decision in writing. Prudential claims that Brown never did so. Instead, she requested, through her attorney, a copy of the long term disability plan. In subsequent letters, her attorney requested a variety of documents, but most notably a complete copy of the Administrative Record on Brown.

Other than requesting that Hunt send Brown a copy of the Plan’s summary plan description and “Wrap” document which described the various benefits available to Hunt employees, Prudential ignored the rest of Brown’s requests. In December 2007, Brown filed a one-count complaint against Hunt in state court. Hunt removed the complaint to federal district court, which determined that as the claims administrator, Prudential was the party liable if Brown was found to be disabled.

In January of 2008, Brown’s attorney contacted Prudential to find out if Brown had filed an administrative appeal. Prudential said, no, and that the deadline for filing that appeal had already expired in November, 2007.

In February, Brown’s attorney contacted Hunt as sponsor of Brown’s LTD Plan, reminding the company that he had requested certain documents but had not received the information. Finally, on March 21, 2008, Hunt mailed the Administrative Record to Brown, but still did not send the claims manuals that had been requested.

In April, Brown filed a two count amendment to the original complaint against both Hunt and Prudential in district court. Count I sought to reinstate Brown’s long term disability benefits, including back benefits. Count II sought statutory penalties for Hunt and Prudential’s failure to respond to her requests for information. The district court dismissed both Counts after Hunt and Prudential filed their motions for summary judgment. Count I was dismissed because Brown had not filed a written administrative appeal to Prudential’s discontinuation of her LTD benefits. The court ruled that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies. Count II was dismissed because Hunt could not be held liable for failing to provide claims manuals.

Brown appealed the district court’s granting Hunt and Prudential summary judgment, claiming that there were genuine issues and that such a judgment was not appropriate. At issue was whether Brown was required to exhaust her administrative remedies. She claimed that she was unable to exhaust those remedies because Prudential failed to provide her with the Administrative Record and the other documents she requested. To have appealed the cancellation of her benefits without this information would have been comparable to appealing “in the blind.”

After reviewing the facts, the Court came to the same conclusion. They determined that Prudential had failed under ERISA provision § 1133(2) to provide Brown with “a reasonable opportunity . . . for a full and fair review” of Prudential’s decision to discontinue her LTD benefits, thus the court’s general requirement that all administrative solutions be used first before filing suit did not apply in her case.

The Court noted that Prudential’s failures to respond to Brown’s requests for sufficient information upon which to formulate an appeal prevented her from making that appeal. Brown had no idea who had determined that she was now able to work in the alternative jobs listed in her notice of benefits termination. She didn’t have access to the methodologies that were applied to her case. She was given detailed instructions as to what her appeal should refute but given no information to refute in that appeal. She had been asked to deliver a detailed challenge to their decision, while being deprived of the information that would allow her to do so.

The Court determined that the appropriate remedy for Count I against Prudential was to reverse the district court’s ruling and instruct the district court to require Prudential to take corrective action by reopening the administrative record. The Court refused to review the merits of Browns claim for long term disability benefits. As for Count I against Hunt and Count II against both Hunt and Prudential, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision.

If the disability claim is governed by ERISA, a disability claimant is required to exhaust all mandatory administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit. But in this case, Prudential failed to provide a copy of the administrative record, therefore, the claimant had no option but to file a lawsuit.

*About the Author: Gregory Michael Dell is an attorney and managing partner of the disability income division of Attorneys Dell and Schaefer (www.diattorney.com). Mr. Dell and his team of lawyers have assisted thousands of long-term disability claimants with their claims against every major disability insurance company. He can be reached at 888-Say-Dell or gdell@diattorney.com.